

Chapter 13

White Order, Corporate Capital, and Control of Mobility in the Netherlands

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On January 1, 2017, an amendment to the Act on Exceptional Measures concerning “Inner-city Problems” (more commonly known as the “Rotterdam law”) took effect (Rijksoverheid 2016).¹ The new amendment extends the scope of available exceptional measures: municipalities are now allowed to allocate housing selectively to new tenants by checking police data or by requesting tenants to submit a certificate of good conduct (VOG)² before granting a housing permit. Mayors are now also authorized to access police records dating back four years to see whether there have been any complaints against new tenants regarding nuisance, violence, intimidation of neighbors, public drunkenness, and radicalized behavior.

Special legislative measures such as these and the practice of “banning orders” (Schuilenburg 2015) such as the Collective Pub Ban and the Collective Shop Ban have given major Dutch cities the means not only to regulate the number of new residents into economically disadvantaged neighborhoods, but also to selectively deny them access to certain public and private spaces throughout the city. These contemporary practices intended to surveil, regulate, and contain “anti-socials” in metropolitan space have a colonial genealogy that remains unacknowledged. In this chapter, we will bring to the fore the historical, ideological, and cultural continuities that enable the surveillance and regulation of “undesirables,” and their role in securing corporate capital’s interests. The archive of technologies used to track enslaved Africans (as property) and the surveillance of the plantation complex should be regarded as important precursors of contemporary spatial regulation and control. We introduce the concept of “white order” to address the violent spatializing practices that racialize and dispossess urban populations in the Netherlands. We propose “white order” as an analytic tool to account for how populations and capital are spatially and socially “ordered” in the

Netherlands. We make explicit the construction of Dutch whiteness as regulated space and behavior, geared toward the accumulation of wealth. Whiteness is narrated through colonial tropes and enforced through management techniques—normalized violence—equally indebted to colonialism.

Race in the Netherlands works surreptitiously in spatial policy and the management of populations. The trope of “antisocial behavior,” that appears frequently in political discourse and spatial policy, contributes greatly to the construction of a nationalist, gendered, sexualized, neurotypical socio-spatial framework of “proper” White Native Dutchness. Propriety here signals an intimate association that is discursively and materially established between liveability, prosperity, safety and, security. Focusing on “liveability” policies and legal instruments deployed in Dutch cities, we sketch how the government rationalizes a racially based politics of containment and proscription. “Liveability” serves as a generic term for anything that could undermine the living environment, especially in metropolitan areas. We argue that “liveability” policies, which are supposedly designed to improve the lives of *all* Dutch citizens, take as a reference point and create a preferable environment for middle class, heteronormative, able-bodied, neurotypical white persons who serve as the desirable norm against which all other forms of life are judged.

The desire to create a “liveable” environment for “good, proper, *normal* life” animates the message conveyed in a recent letter “to all Dutch people” issued by Prime Minister Mark Rutte. In it he states,

We feel a growing discomfort when people abuse our freedom to ruin things here, when in fact they came to our country because of that freedom. People who refuse to adapt, disrespect our customs, and reject our values. Who harass gay men, jeer at women in short skirts, or accuse ordinary Dutch people of being racists. I understand very well that people might think: if you so fundamentally reject our country, I prefer that you leave. I feel the same way. Act normally, or leave.

We should never consider this behavior normal in our country. The solution is not to paint people with the same brush, or insult or expel whole groups. That’s not how we build society together, right? The solution is first and foremost a question of mindset. We must continue to make crystal clear what is normal and what is not normal in this country. We will have to actively defend our values. (Rutte 2017)

This letter was published in the website of the Dutch prime minister’s neo-liberal party VVD and was widely distributed and commented on by major (inter-)national media outlets. Mark Rutte’s plea for “normal” is far from extraordinary. The trope of “normal” enjoys wide currency in Dutch society and entails abiding by “the rules.” It is important to unpack the strong affective appeal to a “common” sense of “normal” within Rutte’s letter. Anti-racism critique, homophobia, and sexism/misogyny are all equated and positioned

as threats to “our country” and liveability. Refusing to adapt ruins “liveable space” and constitutes an abuse of freedom.

The prime minister’s central message is that all one needs to do in order to “build a society together” is to “act normal.” The charge to “act normal” assumes a supposed shared orientation of what constitutes normality. As Mark Rutte’s letter attests, “normality” requires the removal of *dissent* from purview: those who do not accept “the natural order of things” are summoned to leave. This is an explicit indictment of black and Muslim dissent, construed as deviant, outside of the boundaries of the norm and, therefore, outside of the community of the “we.” Normal, then, is produced as “ordinary,” “acceptable,” “safe” through the construction of a “disordered,” “threatening,” “antisocial” Other. Both tropes “normal” and its companion “ordinary” are predicated on a racial economy of containment and removal. By banning and removing populations that are marked as *abject*, *unruly*, *black*, white order is scripted as *order* as it produces blackness as *disorder* and Islam as a challenge to white order. White order, then, has become synonymous not only with “liveable space” but also with “normal behavior.”

We offer “white order” as a means to give greater consideration to the spatialized and “ordering” consequences of violent yet unexceptional practices of everyday life that produce the “normal” and “ordinary.” We understand “white order” to be a structure that encompasses spatial, legal, political, and cultural dimensions in which the “deliberate blocking out or disregard of a ‘Black’ voice,” (Wynter 2003, 268) and black life is a defining and necessary feature of its operation. To elaborate on the constitution of *the black* under a regime of antiblackness:

[A]lthough the human race is normatively white, racialized human beings, in other words, a subspecies of humanity, are nonwhite. The negation is the supposedly opposite term—in a word, the black. In effect, then, in the antiblack world there is but one race, and that race is black. Thus to be racialized is to be pushed “down” toward blackness, and to be deracialized is to be pushed “up” toward whiteness. (Gordon 1997, 76)

White order is not primarily constituted by “exclusion,” but rather by what Sylvia Wynter calls “the ongoing imperative of securing the wellbeing of our present ethnoclass (i.e., Western bourgeois) conception of the human, Man” (Wynter 2003, 260). The logic underwriting “white order” may be defined “as a logic of social organization that produces regimented, institutionalized, and militarized conceptions of hierarchized ‘human’ difference” (Rodríguez 2006, 11).

As a racializing force, “white order” not only regulates the hierarchization of “human” difference but also the distribution of wealth, opportunities,

disease, and life chances of different (national) subjects (Jeeninga 2006; Ruijsbroek et al. 2011). Ruth Wilson Gilmore's (2002) theorization of racism is instructive here. Gilmore defines racism as "a practice of abstraction, a death-dealing displacement of difference into hierarchies that organize relations within and between the planet's sovereign political territories" (16). As a political assemblage, "liveability" programs continuously attempt to control the ensemble of conditions in which a nonwhite person lives through the regulation of "quality of life." François Delaporte (1986) argues, "Living conditions affect two distinct areas, one within the body, the other outside it: organic space and social space. Social space is the space within which the organism lives and labors, and the conditions of existence within that space—living conditions—determine the probability of life and death" (80).

The organization of (public and private) space and social relations is therefore a normalized biopolitical operation under a managerial and policy framework. However, it hides the very same racial mechanisms explicitly at work in the Dutch prime minister's letter, and in "urban renewal"—state-initiated diversification—programs designed to make urban spaces more "liveable." "Liveability" is constantly monitored through statistics and indices that measure compositional and patterned "diversity." The "Safety Index," the official index used by municipalities to gauge "liveability," includes an "ethnicity" variable to the effect that a neighborhood in which relatively many *allochtoon* people (allochthonous or alien) live automatically gets a lower rating on the Index (Noordegraaf 2008). The sign of a neighborhood's "success" correlates with a low quantity of "undesirable elements," which embody risk, unluckiness, and as such pose a "threat" to liveability. Racial violence is mediated through indices and bureaucratic metrics, which calibrate the composition of "unsafe" neighborhoods.

For instance, the Dutch government identifies in its "liveability program" "problem families," which "are characterized by a number of issues, such as debt, unemployment and poor parenting" (Government of the Netherlands 2015), as a (potential) menace to liveability. In neighborhoods with "problem families" and a substantial *allochtoon* population "a strategy of 'social conquest'" is deployed which requires "a massive commitment of all stakeholders to improve liveability" (Engbersen, Snel, and Weltevrede 2005, 5). Both "problem families" and *allochtoon* people are understood as undermining "the normal functioning of society," and thus white order.

BODIES OF DIRT—THREATENING MOBILITIES

Projects aimed at improving liveability target specifically urban areas with a sizeable *allochtoon* population. *Allochtoon*,³ a common term in Dutch social

management, political discourse and colloquial language, is used to categorize a person born abroad, or a “person of whom at least one parent was born abroad” (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 2015). The term itself refers to someone’s origins. However, origin is not only restricted to parentage or ancestry. The Central Bureau of Statistics defines origin as a “characteristic showing with which country someone *actually* is closely related given their own country of birth and that of their parents” (ibid.; emphasis added). Origin is, thus, defined in terms of a characteristic (that is a distinguishing *mark*, or trait that helps to identify or describe recognizably) and more importantly *loyalty*.

The prime minister’s call to “actively defend our values” is not issued purely for rhetorical purposes in this instance. We read this call in relation to several occasions in which the military offered assistance in police operations. A military unit that served in Afghanistan assisted Amsterdam police officers in mapping the behavior of Dutch citizens of Turkish and Moroccan descent in the Amsterdam district Bos en Lommer. Writing about the operation, which was called PsyCops, Paul Mutsaers (2014) notes that the Chief Inspector told him in an interview that, “I want to know everything about them. Knowledge is power. So, for instance, I have a Moroccan target group. I want to know: where do their parents come from, exactly? Which specific areas? What kind of religion do they adhere to? Who has contact with whom?”

PsyCops was not the first military operation in an Amsterdam borough (see: Ministerie van Defensie 2012). We read these military incursions alongside the intrusive policy practices of “intervention teams.” In “Protocol Home Visits Urban and Municipal Intervention Rotterdam,” a document issued by the municipality of Rotterdam, the writers explain that the mission of intervention teams is to “intervene in the vital worlds of citizens: physical world, living space, world of work, financial, social and emotional world” (Gemeente Rotterdam 2007).

Intervention adumbrates forcible strategic interference with a political or medical objective in the state/affairs of another with the aim to *improve*, *restore*, or *prevent*; it is thus strongly associated with both the military and the medical industry. Given the connotation of intervention, it is unsurprising that the care-giving activity of “intervention teams” has overtones of a colonial military operation on all fronts. Intervention teams are explicitly deployed to *take back*, *reclaim*, and *reconquer* “security risk areas.” Intervention teams are not only tasked with bringing order in the streets, which falls under the purview of the police, but also inside “antisocial” homes. “Problem families” are consequently subjected to intimate surveillance and/or removed from residential blocks/the city, since they threaten “liveability.”

The obsession with monitoring “the hearts and minds” of those who are thought of as posing a risk to the rule of law is not new. Moreover, it reveals

the entanglement between state control and capital. In *Perceptions of Protest: Defining the Dangerous in Colonial Sumatra*, Ann Stoler (1985, 642) delineates “how protection of corporate capital’s private interests became synonymous with the maintenance of a public *rust en orde* (peace and order).” Stoler (1985) argues that “discipline and order” (*tucht en orde*) were instrumental “colonial ideals for establishing and maintaining authority” (644). The following quote is especially salient for it shows that the current preoccupation with “suspicious travel movements” has a long colonial genealogy: “The term ‘dangerous elements’ (*gevaarlijke elementen*) was first applied to runaway coolies [indentured servants] who, the planters claimed, often joined (or themselves organized) roving bands of vagrants predatory on estate produce and property” (645).

It is worth unpacking the term “dangerous elements,” which resonates with the term *allochtoon*. The term *allochtoon*, which is borrowed from geology, suggests an amalgam of race/ethnicity, territory/the elements, and allegiance. “Allochthonous rocks” Dvora Yanow and Marleen van der Haar (2010, 18–19) write, “are recognizable as having been created out of specific geological components constituted out of the soil, water, air, and sun characteristic of the setting in which they originated.” Bodies, which are always-already mediated through race, are, then, territorialized through terms like *allochtoon* and its opposite, *autochtoon* (native), and it is through geography by way of soil properties that racialized bodies are consigned to different physical and metaphorical spaces. Even though both terms refer to soil, it is only *allochtoon* that carries the trace of dirt, or—to put it more bluntly—dirtiness.

Dirt is matter out of place. “Dirt,” writes Mary Douglas (1966), “is the by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements” (36). Dirt also connotes blackness. Frantz Fanon (1970, 146) writes, “when one is dirty one is black—whether one is thinking of physical dirtiness or of moral dirtiness.” Dirt is, then, not only a matter of spatial, but also racial and moral designation. Even second-generation immigrants born on putative Dutch soil are still referred to as *allochtoon*—as being out of place. White order is established through tracing, monitoring, and containing traits of perceived danger in space.

THE FREEDOM, SECURITY AND PROSPERITY CIRCUIT

Control over the mobility of enslaved people was an essential characteristic of effective surveillance of the plantation complex. Slavery depended on the tight restriction and monitoring of both “legitimate” and “illegitimate” mobility. Unsupervised movement of enslaved people was criminalized and punished because it posed a threat to the plantation economy, and property

relations. Simone Browne (2012, 542) points out that much of the “technologies instituted through slavery to track blackness as property anticipate the contemporary surveillance of the racial body.” One such technology, the “lantern laws,” (Nationaal Archief—Den Haag 1807) demanded that unattended enslaved people, free black people, and “coloreds” carry lanterns with lit candles after dark. The system of enforced visibility has translated in being visible for authorities (having “freedom papers,” carrying a lantern, being documented). After abolition, “undetectable movement” remained considered as dangerous and even criminal when associated with black people. For this reason, “black movement is, more often than not, *read* as disruptive physicality” (Cervenak 2014, 5). The primary aim of enforced visibility is to discipline and control both citizens and non-citizens, and “[s]ince the function of the state is the protection of private profits of the ruling class and its corporations, the citizens’ very bodies, when inconvenient to capital accumulation, are declared enemies of the state, and the full force of nationalist rhetoric and state violence is used to destroy them” (Pine 2010, 266).

If the defining characteristics of the “proper citizen” are “openness, a strong belief in visibility and directness, the need for, and the belief in control and regulation,” (Hoving 2004) then anyone who is unknowable, untraceable, undocumented and, unmonitored will be perceived as potentially subversive to not only state authority and “peace and order” but also corporate capital. The criminalization of fugitivity, waywardness, and vagrancy is the condition of possibility for “free” and “legitimate” travel. It is no coincidence that states’ drive to monopolize the “legitimate means of movement” so as to restrict or facilitate movement “paralleled states’ monopolization of the legitimate means of violence” (Torpey 1998, 240). State violence is, thus, always-already implicated in “legitimate” travel and no movement is “free” unless it is in service of corporate capital.

In the 2014 *speech from the throne*,⁴ Prime Minister Mark Rutte and the Vice-Prime Minister Lodewijk Asscher—of the Labour party PvdA—note that “freedom, security, and prosperity are closely intertwined” (Government of the Netherlands 2014). This belief is echoed by Halbe Zijlstra—chairman of the neoliberal party VVD—who said that the one “[w]ho sacrifices security for prosperity will lose both” (Zijlstra quoted in DutchNews.nl 2014). The fact that they posit that freedom, prosperity (corporate capital), and security are intimately connected should give us reason to pause. Here, we can take security to refer “not only to abstract, emotive, and ideological states but [also] to individual financial assets” (Cuevas 2012, 605).

More security is understood as a means to more freedom and prosperity; conversely, safeguarding freedom and prosperity requires a commitment to security. A particular idea of freedom and prosperity underpins this circular logic. This adds a layer to the notion of “abusing our freedom” expressed

in the prime minister's letter, which might be read as abusing our prosperity. National security and prosperity are defined in terms of and through the "health" of "our" economic activities.

Within this securitized capitalist framework, "freedom" is nothing more than the rhetorical currency through which the state secures corporate economic interests. The fact that "freedom" and "the democratic legal order" are being articulated in terms of prosperity (as financial health) *and* property ownership has significant implications for how immigrants and refugees are being perceived. Both immigrants and refugees are being judged in terms of economic viability, or their "cost to society."

In 2010, for instance, the Freedom Party (the extreme Right party lead by Geert Wilders, PVV) attempted to calculate "how much an Allochtoon costs." Surveys into the costs and benefits of racialized lives are not only restricted to the PVV; they can be found across the political spectrum. More recently, amidst what has been narrated as a "refugee crisis" in Europe, *De Volkskrant*, a purportedly left-leaning newspaper, published an article entitled "How much do asylum seekers actually cost?" (Hofs 2015). The calculation of the cost of immigrant and refugee lives is illustrative of the logic underlying the freedom-security-prosperity circuit.

State initiatives to restrict "unauthorized" or "irregular" movement by increasing "security" should be seen as part of the government's economic "recovery" policy in times of austerity. State violence is deployed as a necessary means to protect the vitality of the Dutch economy,⁵ and prevent the physical disruption of white order. In other words, state violence is geared toward safeguarding white Dutch civil existence, "a form of collective life that is disingenuously universalized to the point of transparency" (Rodríguez 2007, 133–4). Across the continent, freedom, security, and prosperity emerge through the organized efforts of Europeans "to keep Europe white, pure, and 'secular' in ways that do not interrogate the violence that underwrites that very project" (Butler 2009, 21). Racial violence sets the conditions for freedom, security, and prosperity; it makes all life subordinate to neoliberal notions of security, prosperity, and freedom. This is to say that colonialism informed the economic and political organization of society and that coloniality guarantees the maintenance and thriving of racial capitalism.

"Maladjusted-ness," "antisocial," "allochtoon" function as a conceit for a person's relationship to structures of capital and white order. The security regime and the discourse of "normal" and "ordinary" mutually construct "the proper citizen" along familiar lines of race, class, ability, gender, a normative sexuality, and also language. Surveillance strategies and crime prevention policies tied to "liveability" emerge as means to bring about an internal coherence for white *autochtoon* Dutch society.

CHANCES OF BLACK/ENED LIFE IN A WHITE NATION

The security regime of the state in service of maximizing prosperity has rendered all life calculable. Risk assessments that turn populations into probability data sets allow for the exercise of control over all aspects of life. The belief that the value of life is calculable in terms of the parameters of “white order” is symptomatic of the intersections between political economy and libidinal economy, which “necessarily works to substantiate a community, to establish the elementary social ties without which a coherent social group fails to exist” (Hook 2012, 166). Immigrants, refugees, and allochtonen recurrently have to prove how “useful” their life is to the Dutch nation-state project. In both the metaphorical and physical spaces of the Netherlands, the life of racialized subjects and, moreover, *our* citizenship is conditional.

The appraisal of *aliens* in terms of “use” is yet another colonial legacy. Historically, the Dutch Caribbean, and by extension the Antillean, which is a shorthand for black and criminal have been scripted as “useless,” (de Jong 2012, 7) and as a financial drain on the Netherlands (Redactie 2015). The *usefulness* of racialized lives is associated with their *chances* of thriving, as these lives are narrated as *kansrijk* (rich in chances) or *kansarm* (poor in chances). The rhetoric of chance and probability hides the constitutive violence that produces racial hierarchy and skewed life chances. The attribution of differential life value and life chances to groups of people (based on neoliberal understandings of “success”) is an extension of the constitutive practice in which the legitimacy of life is grounded upon the valuation of the human above the nonhuman. “Kansarm,” which is used to classify those “most in need,” is illustrative of the erasure of the violence of racial capitalism.

“Kansarm” translates as *disadvantaged*, or *underprivileged*, but it means literally “poor in chances.” To designate someone as *kansarm* is to assign them a statistical and perceived risk, which delimits their possibilities and constrains their life. To be *kansarm* is, in other words, to have a life that is statistically curtailed. However, to be *kansarm* is more than “simply” the result of *bad luck*—rather it is the outcome of a deliberate racial calculus. As Lisa Tessman accurately posits, certain forms of luck are “systemic rather than natural or accidental luck” (Tessman 2005, 30). This terminology puts in evidence the short line woven between care *for the poor* (in chances) and state security. Moreover, the discourse on *kansrijk* and *kansarm* does not “account for the existence of ‘Blacks’ on the sociopolitical terrain and for the continuing influence of those cultural, political, and epistemological forces that sustain and shape Black existence” (Keeling 2003, 92).

In *Rotterdam Zet Door: Een Stad in Balans* (Rotterdam Goes Forward: A City in Balance) the municipality of Rotterdam adopts a formula that renders *kansarm* synonymous with nonwhite, namely: “The colour is not the

problem, however, the problem does have a colour.” Here, color—meaning nonwhite—functions as a sign of danger, risk, and liability. Disadvantaged people are considered a financial drain and a threat to liveability. The coarticulation of prosperity, liveability, and safety has given rise to contemporary strategies intended to keep “the disadvantaged” out of major cities, if not out of the Netherlands. One such strategy is a bill proposed in 2014 by incumbent MP André Bosman of the neoliberal ruling party VVD. The proposed “Bosman-bill” intends to regulate immigration from Aruba, Curaçao, and Sint Maarten to the Netherlands. If approved the bill would institute conditions for Antilleans (described as *kansarm*, by Bosman) to settle in the former metropolitan territory, conditions such as a minimum income (Deira 2014).⁶

Bosman argues,

Many of these people are disadvantaged [kansarm] by Dutch standards. People leaving their homeland for a country where they have few opportunities does nobody any good. They often have no diploma, don’t speak the language well, and end up relatively frequently in criminality. Between 2006 and 2010 one in five Antilleans came into contact with the police, compared with 1 in 20 Dutch natives. In addition, in 2010 11.3% of Antilleans in the Netherlands were at home, unemployed. These are alarming figures. It cannot be that we have to bear the burden for problems that start on the other side of the ocean. The faucet really needs to be turned off. (Bosman quoted in ANP 2014)

Recourse to the metaphorical realm of the (white/imperial) *burden* and the Atlantic (*ocean*) is not gratuitous. It speaks to a common sense around black/ened bodies and lives, which is historically shaped and phantasmagorically though insidiously present at our times.

CONCLUSION

The discourse on “safety” and “freedom” and “democracy” and “prosperity” hides the ordinariness of everyday violence that accompanies the protection of corporate capital and the securitization of public space—the detention and incapacitation of black and non-black people of color both at home and abroad—and the tremendous violence that constitutes the human. Everyday racial violence is that which makes “democracy” and “safety,” as markers of political stability, cohere. However, “democracy” and “safety” and “freedom” or, to put it plainly, “the violent spectacles of racialization that [white supremacy] calls the ‘maintenance of order,’” (Martinot and Sexton 2003, 179) constitute a state of emergency for black and blackened folk (brown people).

The current anxiety about “mobile threats” obscures how the racial, gender, class, and sexual dimensions of “security,” “freedom,” “prosperity,” and “democracy” function through the criminalization, disposability, and killability of “suspicious bodies.” At the same time, particular stories are clustering around certain groups (Nagtzaam 2016)—specifically black and brown people—that render them more “suspicious” than others, so that it becomes very difficult not to think of, or read them without, a set of affectively charged associations.

The deadly logic of “democratic inclusion,” which “[defines] freedom through captivity” (James 2013, 124), has created, through an ever-growing set of brutal political and economic configurations, a class of black and brown people that is able to *observe* the dying black and brown people at the European Union border. Democracy has created populations “on the outside” whose deaths “as by an invisible hand [restore] the market to what it must be to support life” (Montag 2005, 15). Political stability and “security,” which are maintained by the police, “represent a zone of indistinction between violence and law perfectly symmetrical to that of sovereignty.” Violence-as-law and Law-as-violence work in tandem to preserve the sanctified category of citizen—the lives “worth preserving.”

The world of *peace and order* promised by “democracy” is a ruse for capitalism’s continuous production of death, and dispossession. Violence is a condition of democracy’s coherence. The rationale of letting die, or exposing to death, as a necessary condition for the maximization of life and prosperity is what animates “democracy.” It is through the deaths at the EU border—that is “democracy’s boundaries”—that the fantasy of black citizenship gains its coherence.

However, generation after generation of those produced as *aliens* “learn[s] that black citizenship itself is suspicious and that your color is itself a challenge to authority” (Rogers 2014). The citizenship “rights” afforded to black(ened) subjects offer no security or stable identity; these “rights” are speculative rather than substantive, they don’t *unblacken*.

As Jude McCulloch (2007, 19) notes the construction of a mobile criminal threat offers “a productive fiction, establishing a rhetorical platform for the transformation and extension of the coercive capacities of states.” And “protecting the rule of law” against “mobile threats” has opened up ways to mark anyone whose movements are “irregular,” or “suspicious” as a potential threat to “our freedom,” and to “the democratic legal order.” We need to thoroughly deconstruct the colonial masculinist logic that constitutes certain people as “suspicious” through invasive surveillance, evaluation, and classification, and, then, purports to offer the nation “protection” from such wandering “dangerous elements.”

The removal of the black from purview is the founding act of civil society, and civil society enacts this ordinary violence continuously as it

simultaneously repudiates the use of extreme force. Within the framework of “white order,” state violence—under the guise of “restoring order,” “managing care,” and a nondescript concern for the “quality of life”—is rendered not only permissible, but necessary and desired/desirable. The Dutch prime minister, and the rulings and policies of Dutch cities are *responding* to the threat of racialized mobilities *calling for* control. Above all, they are securing white order for corporate capital. *Rust, tucht and orde*.

NOTES

1. This chapter is a thoroughly revised version of the article originally published as: Egbert Alejandro Martina and Patricia Schor, “White Order: Racialization of Public Space in the Netherlands,” *Dedalus—Revista Portuguesa De Literatura Comparada*, no. 19: Cultures of (In)Security—Culturas de (In)Segurança (2015), 161–88. That article was later translated by Daniel Mandur Thomaz and published as: Egbert Alejandro Martina and Patricia Schor, “Ordem Branca: A Racialização do Espaço Público (Reflexões Sobre O Caso Holandês),” *Revista Transversos* 6, no. 6: Áfricas: História, Literatura e Pensamento Social (2016), 125–48. The authors wish to thank the editors of both journals for granting permission for this publication.

2. A Certificate of Good Behaviour (Verklaring Omtrent Gedrag) is a statement issued by Justis, the screening authority, that says that your past behavior does not preclude you from fulfilling a specific task or function in society. Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, “Wat is Een VOG?” <https://www.justis.nl/producten/vog/> (accessed January 5, 2017).

3. As of November 2016, these terms are officially no longer in use by the government, but replaced with the umbrella term “people with a migration background.” However, this terminology remains throughout Dutch society.

4. The *troonrede* is the text composed by the Dutch cabinet and read out by the Dutch monarch addressing the citizens of the monarchy in national broadcasting. This text expresses the cabinet’s diagnosis of the state of Dutch politics and society, and announces the political tendencies of the coming budgetary period.

5. Even though “unauthorized mobilities” are framed as compromising the vitality of Dutch economic interests, the policing of “unauthorized mobilities” has created opportunities for detention centers.

6. The Bosman Bill has been discussed in the Dutch parliament at several occasions, since its proposition in 2012. VVD’ coalition partner Labour Party had already stated the need to regulate the settlement from citizens from Curaçao, Aruba and Sint Maarten but did not reach an agreement with the VVD as how this should take shape. In October 2016, the Bosman Bill was finally rejected by parliament.